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Abstract
We analyse the optimal level of political decision making, national
or regional. The benefit of policy making at the regional level is that it
allows for policy diﬀerentiation, which serves the interests of regional
majorities. The argument in favor of a national policy is that it may
generate a more moderate policy, which protects the interests of re-
gional minorities. Our paper analyses how the degree of geographical
segregation and the degree of polarization of preferences aﬀect the
trade-oﬀ between these two concerns.
Keywords: Segregation; radicalization; regional autonomy; wel-
fare; mobility.
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1 Introduction
In a pluralistic world where individuals disagree about the ideal public policy
there is always latent conflict. Not everyone can get his or her ideal policy
realized. In many countries, conflicting interests follow ethnic, linguistic,
religious, and cultural lines. These groups typically cluster in space. Hence,
national minorities may form regional majorities. The geographical level of
decision making, regional or national, may thus be important in determining
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the influence of diﬀerent groups in society. Regional majorities may be able
to define policies in a regional vote, but have little influence over policies in
a national vote.
With the rise in geographical segregation and polarization of preferences
that we observe in many countries, the call for increased decentralization of
political power seems to be on the rise. Theoretically, there are good ar-
guments in favor of such decentralization, as captured by the well known
“decentralization theorem” (Oates, 1972). This theorem states that, in the
absence of scale economies and inter-regional spillovers, welfare maximizing
local authorities may tailor the supply of local public services to local tastes,
and thereby achieve a solution that is welfare superior to the solution pro-
vided by the central government. As stated by Oates (1994, page 130): “The
tailoring of outputs to local circumstances will, in general, produce higher
levels of well-being than a centralized decision to provide some uniform level
of output across all jurisdictions.” In Oates’ analysis, the gains from de-
centralization are larger the more mobile is the population, and the more
polarized are their preferences.
As a foundation to inform the public debate, the decentralization the-
orem is a useful benchmark, but should be treated with some caution. In
particular, the result rests on the assumption that policies are designed by a
welfare maximizing central planner. In practice, democratic institutions do
not guarantee fair or eﬃcient outcomes. In particular, majority voting may
result in the marginalization of minority interests.
Protection of minority interests was seen by the founding fathers of the
American constitution as one of the main advantages of a union. Madi-
son argued in the federalist papers that: “Among the numerous advantages
promised by a well constructed Union, none deserves to be more accurately
developed than its tendency to break and control the violence of faction.”
Elaborating on his position, he states that: “The smaller the society, the
fewer the distinct parties and interests, the more frequently will a majority
be found of the same party; and the smaller the number of individuals com-
posing a majority, and the smaller the compass in which they are placed, the
more easily will they concert and execute their plans of oppression. Extend
the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you
make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common mo-
tive to invade the rights of other citizens.” (Madison 1787). Clearly, Madison
was aware of the possibility that regional autonomy may lead to unattrac-
tive solutions for the country, by giving too much power to regional majority
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interests.
The present paper analyses the trade-oﬀ between the benefits of decentral-
ization, as emphasized by Oates, and the benefits of a union, as emphasized
by Madison. Political decision making in our model is based on majority
voting, in a decentralized solution at the regional level and in a centralized
solution at the national level. In line with the decentralization theorem, the
gains from regional autonomy are due to diﬀerentiation of policies, while the
gains from a common policy are due to the potential moderation of policies
in a national vote. We abstract from the standard arguments in favor of
centralized decision making, namely scale economies and strategic interac-
tion, and focus on the potential of a national vote in creating a diﬀerent, and
more moderate, vote than local elections. Our analysis demonstrates that,
contrary to the intuition underlying the decentralization theorem, increased
segregation and increased mobility may actually constitute arguments in fa-
vor of centralization.
The insights from our paper should be particularly relevant to emerging
democracies that are in the process of designing a constitution specifying
the degree of regional autonomy in the country. Many of these countries
are making a transition from a dictatorship that placed a lid on religious
and ethnic factionalization, to a democratic process where political interest
groups often form along religious and ethnic lines. Our analysis can be seen
as an attempt at shedding light on the optimal design of constitutions in
these countries. In particular we analyze how the degree of segregation and
polarization of preferences aﬀect the welfare maximizing level of political
decision making.
By focusing on potential conflicts of interests at both the national and
regional level, our analysis departs from most of the recent literature on po-
litical centralization and decentralization, see for instance Bolton and Roland
(1996, 1997), Alesina and Spolaore (1997), Ellingsen (1998), Besley and
Coate (1999) and the subset of this literature that deals with education and
in particular education finance systems, such as Fernández and Rogerson
(1996, 1999), and Hoxby (1996) for an overview. In this literature, regions
are typically assumed to be inhabited by people with relatively homogenous
tastes.
Ellingsen (1998) analyses intra-regional conflicts. There are, however,
only two types of people in his model, and hence the possibility of centraliza-
tion representing a compromise solution is not considered. Crémer and Pal-
frey (1996) also consider local conflicts of interests, and address the positive
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issue of when regional median voters are likely to vote in favor of centraliza-
tion. In the absence of scale advantages and interregional externalities (as in
our paper), they demonstrate that with full information about the election
outcome regional median voters will never vote for a centralized solution. If
there is more uncertainty about the identity of the median voter on the local
level than on the central level, however, the majority vote on the local level
may be in favor of forming, or joining, a political union.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model, assuming
no mobility in the population. Section 3 analyses the trade-oﬀ between na-
tional and regional decision making. Section 4 extends the model by opening
up for mobility. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
Consider a country populated by two groups of people, a and b, divided
along, for instance, ethnic and/or religious lines. There are two regions in
the country, A and B, with a-types and b-types living together in each re-
gion. The level of integration between the two groups may, however, vary. In
addition to the geographical distribution of the population, we are interested
in preference distribution. Each group consists of “radicals” and “moder-
ates”. For simplicity, we assume that the moderates in both camps share
the same preferences. In eﬀect, therefore, we have three preference groups
in society, group a radicals, group b radicals, and moderates. The smaller is
the share of moderates in society, the larger is the degree of polarization of
preferences. In order to reduce the possible number of geographical constel-
lations of preference groups, we assume that the radicals constitute a share
r of each ethnic/religious group. Thus, r captures the degree of polarization
in society.
We normalize the size of group b to unity, so that a measures the size of
a relative to b. Without loss of generality, let a > 1. We assume that there
is a concentration of group a in region A, and a concentration of group b in
B. Region A is thus the “home” region of group a, and B is the “home”
region of group b. Let a share s ≥ 0.5 of groups a and b be located in their
home regions. Thus, s is our measure of segregation. For s = 1, there is full
segregation, with the two ethnic/religious groups living separately in their
respective home regions. The closer is s to one half, the more integrated is
the population.
4
We assume that policy issues can be measured on a single dimension,
denoted by g. Let the ideal policy of the radicals in group a be given by g∗a =
0, and the radicals in group b by g∗b = γ. The moderates place themselves
in the middle of these two extremes, their preferences therefore given by
g∗m = γ/2. Being exposed to policies that diﬀer from one’s own ideal is
associated with a loss of utility. We shall make the key assumption that the
utility loss is a convex function of the distance between the actual and ideal
policy.1 The utility loss of individual i being exposed to policy g is given by
the following quadratic loss function:
vi = (g∗i − g)
2 . (1)
Our formulation of preferences implies that the utility loss experienced
as a result of a given distortion between the ideal and the actual policy is
the same for all individuals. Note that the utility loss for a radical living
in a region where policy is defined by the opposite radical type is given by
γ2, whereas a the utility loss of a moderate being exposed to radical policies
or a radical living in a jurisdiction with moderate policies is given by γ2/4.
Living in a region where policies are according to one’s own ideal results in
zero loss.
Policies are determined by majority voting and are thus defined by the
preferences of the median voter in the relevant jurisdiction.2 Decisions are
either made at the regional level or at the national level. The outcome of
majority vote at the regional level depends on the regional composition of
preferences, while the outcome of majority vote at the national level depends
on the composition of preferences in the country as a whole. Without policy
competition or scale economy arguments in favor of the centralized solution,
the only argument in favor of a national policy is the possibility that the
national vote produces a moderate policy. We shall therefore limit ourselves
1While a convex loss function is intuitively appealing, it is perfectly possible to construct
preference systems that do not have this property. One could, for instance, imagine a
situation where people have strong preferences for a certain policy and are equally unhappy
with all other policies. If this were the case, the mechanisms emphasised in this paper
would not be relevant.
2We therefore abstract from diﬀerent electoral rules, e.g., plurality rule versus pro-
portional rule, and diﬀerent forms of government, e.g., presidential versus parliamentary
systems. For an overview of the literature on the relation between voting systems, forms
of government, and economic policy, see Persson and Tabellini (2004). For an analysis of
the optimal electoral rule behind a veil of ignorance, see Aghion and Bolton (2003).
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to studying the case where a moderate is the median voter at the national
level. The condition that a moderate is the national median voter can be
expressed as r < (1 + a) /2a.3 We shall also abstract from the uninteresting
case where moderates form an absolute majority in both regions, since cen-
tralization and decentralization in that case necessarily would yield the same
outcome. We thus restrict our attention to r > 1
2
.
In the analysis we shall therefore assume that r ∈
¡
1
2
, 1+a
2a
¢
. Note, how-
ever, that even if moderates do not have a simple majority in any region, we
do not exclude the possibility of moderate policies at the regional level. If
there is a fairly balanced distribution of group a radicals and group b radi-
cals in both regions, moderates may still be the decisive voter in one or both
regions.
Given that the national median voter is a moderate, the national policy
outcome is given by gn = γ/2. Each radical then loses γ2/4, so that the total
loss in the country under a national policy is:
Ln = (1 + a) r
γ2
4
, (2)
which is simply the loss of the total population of radicals exposed to
a moderate policy. Consider next the situation with regional autonomy.
Clearly, the welfare loss in this case depends on whether the decisive voters
in the two regions are radicals or moderates. Note that the number of radical
b-types in B is rs. The rest of the population inB consists of a-types living in
this “foreign” region, their number given by (1− s) a, and moderate b-types,
numbering (1− r) s. We see that:
rs = a (1− s) + (1− r) s⇒ s = a
a+ 2r − 1 ≡ sB. (3)
Hence, if s > sB, the radical b-types form a majority in B, whereas if
s ≤ sB, a moderate is the decisive voter in B. Note that the assumption that
the moderates are the median voters at the national level implies that the
radical a-types never can have a majority in B (the same of course applying
to radical b-types in A).
3This can be seen from the fact that the number of group b radicals equals r, the
number of moderates equals (1− r) (1 + a), and the number of group a radicals equals
ra. A moderate is the national median voter when the two former preference groups
outnumber the latter, i.e., that r < (1 + a) /2a.
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The number of radical a-types in A is given by asr. The rest of the
population in A is given by moderate a-types, numbering as (1− r), plus
b-types, their number given by (1− s). We see that:
asr = (1− s) + a (1− r) s⇒ s = 1
1 + a (2r − 1) ≡ sA. (4)
Hence, for s ≤ sA, the median voter in A is a moderate, and for s > sA
a radical. Since a > 1 and r > 1
2
, sB > sA. Hence, for s ≤ sA, the decisive
voter in both regions is a moderate. Table 1 summarizes the way in which the
level of segregation aﬀects the identity of the median voters under regional
autonomy.
Table 1. Segregation and identity of regional median voter
Degree of segregation Median voter at the regional level
1
2
≤ s ≤ sA Moderates in A and B
sA < s ≤ sB Moderates in B and radical in A
sB < s ≤ 1 Radicals in A and B
We shall refer to s ∈
¡
1
2
, sA
¢
as “low” level of segregation, s ∈ (sA, sB)
as “intermediate” level of segregation, and, s ∈ (sB, 1) as the case of “high”
level of segregation. We observe from Table 1 that increased segregation can
lead to a radicalization of regional policies. Starting with s < sA, an increase
in segregation will first lead to the radicalization of policies in region A (as
we cross the critical value sA), followed by B (as we cross the critical value
sB).
Observe that both sA and sB fall in r. Intuitively, an increase in the
degree of polarization reduces the political power of moderates, and thus,
under regional autonomy, leads to the implementation of radical policies in
one or both regions for a larger range of segregation levels. Note also that sA
falls in a whereas sB increases in a. Clearly, an increase in the relative size
of group a gives this group a majority in its home region for a larger range
of segregation levels, whereas segregation must be even higher for group b to
have a simple majority in its home region.
We now turn to the welfare properties of regional autonomy, as a func-
tion of degree of segregation and polarization of preferences in society. When
radicals are the median voters in both regions, i.e., for s > sB, the total
population of “foreign” based radicals has a loss (1 + a) (1− s) rγ2 and the
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total population of moderates loses (1 + a) (1− r) γ2
4
. With radical policy
in A and moderate policy in B, i.e., for s ∈ (sA, sB), the radical b-types
living in region A lose (1− s) rγ2, the radical b-types in B lose rsγ2
4
, the
radical a-types in B lose a (1− s) r γ2
4
and, finally, the moderates in A lose
((1− r) as+ (1− s) (1− r)) γ2
4
. With a moderate median voter in both re-
gions, i.e., for s ≤ sA, the policy outcome and hence the welfare loss is clearly
identical to that of the national solution. The welfare loss under regional au-
tonomy is thus given by:
Lr =
(1 + a) (1− s) rγ2 + (1 + a) (1− r) γ2
4
for s > sB
(1− s+ 3r + a (r + s)− 2rs (a+ 1)) γ2
4
for sA < s ≤ sB
(1 + a) r γ
2
4
= Ln for s ≤ sA
. (5)
3 Analysis
We now turn our attention to the analysis of how the key variables, namely
segregation and polarization, aﬀect the trade-oﬀ between majority vote at
the national and regional level. We already know from the discussion above
that in a highly integrated population, i.e., s ≤ sA, the choice between
national or regional decision making does not matter. Given our assumption
of a moderate national median voter, a moderate will in this case also be
the decisive voter in both regions. Hence, our interest lies in s > sA. Our
ambition is to demonstrate how diﬀerences in segregation and polarization
aﬀect political power at the regional level and how this in turn may aﬀect the
welfare maximizing choice between national and regional decision making.
3.1 High level of segregation
In the situations characterized by a high level of segregation, i.e., for s ∈
(sB, 1), radicals are in majority in their respective home regions. With full
segregation, i.e., s = 1, there are no radicals living in a “foreign” region.
Since radicals from one camp being exposed to radical policy from the other
camp are the greatest losers from regional autonomy, the absence of such
radical minorities minimizes the welfare loss associated with a regional vote.
The benefit of diﬀerentiating policy according to local tastes in this case
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dominates the need to protect regional minorities. This can easily be seen
from the fact that (keeping in mind that r > 0.5):
Lr − Ln = 14γ2 (1− 2r) (1 + a) < 0 for s = 1 . (6)
At the other extreme, for s = sB, we find that:
Lr − Ln = γ
2
4
(1 + a) 2r(2r−a)+a−1a+2r−1 > 0 for s = sB . (7)
This implies that national decision making is welfare superior to local
autonomy at this level of integration. In this case, there is a substantial
number of a-radicals living in region B and b-radicals living in region A. For
s = sB, the utility loss for these minority groups dominates the utility gains
to the regional majority groups under regional autonomy. From (2) and (5)
we find that:
Lr = Ln ⇒ s =
3
4
+
1− r
4r
≡ s2. (8)
It is straightforward to show that s2 > sB. We observe that s2 falls
in r. Our observations from the scenario characterized by a high level of
segregation can be summarized as follows:
Lemma 1 National policy welfare dominates for s ∈ (sB, s2), and regional
autonomy welfare dominates for s > s2.
Proof. This result follows from the fact that Lr = Ln when s = s2, and
the fact that Lr falls in s while Ln is unaﬀected by s.
3.2 Intermediate level of segregation
In the situations characterized by an intermediate level of segregation, i.e.,
for s ∈ (sA, sB), radicals form a majority in region A, while the median voter
in B is a moderate. We first note that within this interval of segregation
levels, national policy welfare dominates regional autonomy. To see this,
consider the case of s = sA, which results in:
Lr − Ln =
³
γ2ra
2
´
2r−1
1+a(2r−1) > 0 for s = sA . (9)
Next, consider the other extreme of the intermediate segregation regime,
s = sB. We find that:
Lr − Ln = γ
2
4
1−4r2+a2(2r−1)
a+2r−1 for s = sB , (10)
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which is negative for r < a
2−1
2
and positive if r > a
2−1
2
.4 Intuitively, since
group for any given level of r, the larger is group a, the smaller is the relative
number of b radicals in A. Since the when group a is relatively large, the
number of b radicals living in region A is relatively small. Note that group
b radicals in A are the main losers from regional autonomy. With a high
level of segregation, the loss to the relatively small group of b radicals in
A is dominated by the welfare gain to group a radicals in A from regional
autonomy. From (2) and (5) we find that:
Lr = Ln ⇒ s = 1+2r1+2r+a(2r−1) ≡ s1 for sA < s ≤ sB , (11)
which applies if r < a
2−1
2
. Summarizing the scenario of intermediate
segregation, we can conclude that:
Lemma 2 Given that r < a
2−1
2
, national policy welfare dominates for s ∈
(sA, s1), and regional autonomy welfare dominates for s ∈ (s1, sB). Given
that r > a
2−1
2
, national policy welfare dominates for all s ∈ (sA, sB).
Proof. This result follows from the fact that Lr = Ln when s = s1, and
the fact that Lr falls in s while Ln is unaﬀected by s.
3.3 Segregation, polarization, and welfare
Based on Lemmas 1 and 2, we can state the main finding of the paper as
follows:
Proposition 1 Increased segregation may cause a radicalization of regional
policies, and thus change the welfare maximizing level of decision making
from regional to national.
Proof. This will be the case given r < a
2−1
2
and an increase in segregation
from a low level s∗ to a higher level s∗∗ with s∗ ∈ (s1, sB), characterized by
a moderate median voter in region B, and s∗∗ ∈ (sB, s2), characterized by
radical majorities in both regions.
The radicalization of policy here comes about as the median voter in
region B changes from a moderate to a radical from group b. This leads to
4To see this, observe that, evaluated at r = a
2−1
2 ,
∂(Lr−Ln)
∂r =
1
2γ
2 2−a2
a2+a−2 . Note that
r = a
2−1
2 ⇔ a =
√
1 + 2r. Clearly, for r > 12 ,
1
2γ
2 2−a2
a2+a−2 < 0.
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a sharp welfare loss for the group a radicals living in region B. If the size of
this preference group is suﬃciently large, i.e., if the population is suﬃciently
integrated, their welfare loss will dominate the gain to the majority-group in
B.
Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between the degree of segregation and
the net gain from regional autonomy, given r < a
2−1
2
.
Lr-Ln 
sA sBs1 s2
s 
1 0.5 
Figure 1: Segregation and welfare
A related finding is that:
Corollary 1 Increased polarization may cause a radicalization of regional
policies, and thus change the welfare maximizing level of decision making
from regional to national.
Proof. Assume that initially s = sB, so that a moderate is the decisive
voter in B, and that r < r0, so that Ln > Lr. An increase in r leads to a
reduction in sB, which for a given level of segregation, changes the political
equilibrium from a moderate to a radical vote in B. We then know from
Lemma 1 that, as long as s ∈ (sB, s2), Lr > Lr.
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4 Extension: Mobility and welfare
So far, we have abstracted from migration between the two regions in the
country. In a situation with regional autonomy, people dissatisfied with the
local policy may have an incentive to leave that region for a region oﬀering a
policy more in harmony with their own ideal. Since individuals only migrate
if this increases their utility, one would expect migration to increase aggregate
welfare in society. However, in this section we show that migration in some
circumstance might have a negative eﬀect on aggregate welfare. Basically,
the reason why migration could reduce aggregate welfare is that relocation
may be associated with a shift in political power at the regional level. While
each migrant takes policy as given, migration aﬀects the regional composition
of interest groups which in turn may aﬀect regional policies.
Assume that each individual faces a fixed mobility cost c. If policy is
determined at the regional level, the net gain from moving to another region
would be γ2 − c for a radical of type a (b) who moves from a region where
the radical of the type b (a) is the median voter to a region where he is
in majority. The gain would be γ2 − γ2/4 − c = 3γ2/4 − c if he moved
to a region where the moderate voters determine the policy. Finally, if a
radical (moderate) moves from a region where a moderate (radical) is the
median voter to a region where his own group decides the policy, the gain
from relocating is only γ2/4− c. If the pre-migration stage is characterized
by c > γ2, then no-one has an incentive to move.
It can be shown that:
Proposition 2 A reduction in migration costs may lead to a fall in aggregate
welfare.
Proof. Consider a situation with regional autonomy where s ∈ (sA, sB)
and initially c > 3
4
γ2. In this situation, the median voter is a radical in
region A and a moderate in region B and there is no incentive to migrate.
Consider now a reduction to c = 3γ2/4 which induces migration of the radical
b-types from region A to region B. As long as there is no change in the type
of median voter in B, this migration has no welfare eﬀects. However, if
s > (a− r) / (a− 1 + r) ≡ s0, the migration of radical b-types into B will be
suﬃciently large to induce a change in the median voter in B from moderate
to type b-radical. This can be seen from the fact that after migration, the
number of b-radicals in B is r, while the number of a-types in B is (1− s) a
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and number of moderate b-types inB is (1− r) s. The radicalization of policy
in B will in turn result in migration of the radicals of type a from region B.
In order to measure the welfare eﬀects of this reduction in migration costs,
notice that there is no change in policy in region A, so that there is no change
in utility for the people who do not leave region A. Each radical b-type gains
γ2
4
. This equals the loss for each moderate in region B. The welfare loss
for each radical a-type in B is 3γ
2
4
− γ2
4
= γ
2
2
, i.e., the migration cost minus
the gain from changing from a pre-migration moderate policy in B to his
ideal policy in A. It is now straightforward to demonstrate that migration
may then to a welfare loss. Consider the situation where, prior to migration,
s = s0 and where the migration of radical b-types into region B therefore
is just large enough to give this group a majority in that region. After the
migration, the number of winners equals the number of losers, but since the
average welfare loss is greater than the average welfare gain, the net eﬀect is
negative.
Given that the political power at the regional level is not altered, migra-
tion improves welfare in society. However, the potential of migration causing
a radicalization of policies at the regional level, may trigger additional migra-
tion flows. The welfare loss of this “domino eﬀect” in the relocation of people
is not internalized by the initial migrants and migration might therefore re-
sult in an aggregate welfare loss. Consequently, the above result demonstrates
that in a regional solution, it may be welfare enhancing to restrict migration.
This observation also implies that:
Corollary 2 A reduction in migration costs may lead to a shift in the welfare
maximizing level of policy, from regional to national.
Proof. Consider a situation where initially c > 3
4
γ2, s = s1+ε, where ε is
a negligibly small number, and r < a
2−1
2
.We then know that the median voter
is a radical in region A and a moderate in region B, that there is no incentive
to migrate, and that Ln > Lr. Now let migration costs fall to c = 34γ
2. The
ensuing migration of radical b types into B changes the median voter in B
from a moderate to a radical b-type. This, in turn, leads to the out-migration
of radical a types from B. The post-migration regional solution is therefore
characterized by full segregation of the radical population, with the number of
migrants equalling (1− s1) r (1 + a). The welfare loss in the regional solution
is then given by the loss to all moderates, (1− r) (1 + a) 1
4
γ2, plus the total
migration cost, which equals c (1− s1) r (1 + a), where s1 = 1+2r1+2r+a(2r−1) from
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equation (11) and c = 3
4
γ2. The loss from the national solution is given
by Ln = (1 + a) r γ
2
4
from (2). We find that Lr − Ln in this case equals
1
4
(1 + a) γ2 1+ra−a−4r
2+2r2a
1+2r+2ra−a , which is positive for r <
a−1
2−a and negative for
r > a−1
2−a .
5 Recall that we have assumed r < a
2−1
2
(so that, prior to migration,
Lr < Ln). Since a > 1 , we know that r < a
2−1
2
⇒ r < a−1
2−a , which in turn
implies that after migration, Lr > Ln.
The reason why the optimal level of decision making may change from
regional to national as migration costs fall, is that a uniform policy at the
national level eliminates the incentives for migration, and hence eliminates
the costly “domino eﬀect” discussed above.
5 Concluding remarks
The optimal level of political decision making, central or local, is high on the
political agenda in most countries. This is particularly true in many emerg-
ing democracies, countries which are typically in the process of shaping their
constitutions. The populations in many of these countries are highly frac-
tionalized along for instance ethnic and/or religious lines. In some cases,
these groups are highly segregated geographically, in others, there is a higher
degree of geographical integration between groups. Casual observation sug-
gests that the degree of polarization is on the rise, with moderate voices being
increasingly marginalized as radicals in the various groups gain strength.
Increased segregation of the population and polarization of preferences
in society is normally seen as a strong argument in favor of decentralized
policies. Following Oates’ decentralization theorem, tailoring local policies
to local tastes will yield welfare improvements relative to a uniform policy
at the national level. The more homogenous are preferences at the regional
level, and the larger is the conflict of interest between various groups, the
greater should the gains from decentralization be.
However, the degree of segregation and polarization also determine the
relative political strength between groups, as emphasized by Madison. Re-
gional autonomy may give power to extremist groups that impose their will
on regional minorities. A uniform national policy determined by a national
5This can be seen from the fact that, evaluated at r = a−12−a ,
∂(Lr−Ln)
∂r =
1
12γ
2 1+a
a (3a− 4)
−2+a
a−1 . Note that r =
a−1
2−a ⇔ a =
1
2r−1 . Since r ∈
¡
1
2 ,
1+a
2a
¢
, it fol-
lows that 112γ
2 1+a
a (3a− 4)
−2+a
a−1 < 0.
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vote may reduce the influence of these radical groups, protect regional mi-
norities, and thus benefit the country as a whole. Our paper has analyzed
the trade-oﬀ between national and regional decision making. This trade-oﬀ
involves weighing the interests of regional majorities, who naturally favor
regional autonomy, against the interests of regional minorities, who would
typically prefer a national solution. We have demonstrated that increased
segregation and polarization, and, indeed, increased mobility, under certain
circumstances may constitute arguments in favor a national solution rather
than regional autonomy.
Our analysis of the optimal choice between regional and national policy
is based on a median voter model. This model generates discrete changes
in policy as the type of median voter changes, and emphasizes how small
alterations in population structure can have a dramatic eﬀects on policy.
Exploring the same questions as we do here within a probabilistic voting
model, where policy is a continuous function of changes in the preference
structure in society, would be an interesting project. Another suggestion for
future research is to extend our model by introducing constitutional rights,
and qualified majority vote, as means of protecting minority interests.
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